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CRIMINAL LAW-RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT OR-
GANIZATION ACT-DEFINING "ENTERPRISE." United States v. An-
derson, 626 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1980).
While serving as Arkansas county judges, Leslie Anderson and
Leonard Mooney met Paul Baldwin, a salesman of materials re-
quired for maintenance of county roads.' In their administrative
capacities as judges, 2 Anderson and Mooney acted as purchasing
agents for their counties. They approved and authorized payments
of bills and accounts, including those to Baldwin.
According to Baldwin, there were two methods he used to make
purchasing through him personally lucrative to these county offi-
cials.3 He testified that on occasion he would charge the list price on
a sales slip for merchandise delivered to the county and then rebate
ten percent of that price to the purchasing agent personally. At
other times Baldwin would enter into a prior agreement with either
Anderson or Mooney to prepare a bogus invoice for merchandise
which, in fact, would never be shipped. Under this scheme the
judge involved would sign for the goods, and then he and Baldwin
would simply split the listed price "fifty-fifty." By use of the purely
bogus invoices Anderson defrauded the citizens of Sharp County of
$4,842.25, and Mooney defrauded Fulton County citizens of
$7,179.72.
Anderson and Mooney were charged by indictment with
twenty-eight criminal violations relating to their dealings with Bald-
win. Included in the indictment were charges of racketeering activ-
ity for their participation in the conspiracy to receive the kickbacks
and payoffs.4 The defendants' denials of ever having had anything
but legitimate business dealings with Baldwin did not persuade the
1. Anderson and Mooney were judges for Sharp and Fulton counties, respectively.
2. Arkansas county judges are not true judicial officers and have few judicial duties.
3. At the time of the trial Baldwin had already been convicted of paying bribes and
kickbacks to other county judges and acted as the government's chief witness against Ander-
son and Mooney.
4. The federal statute under which the defendants were charged is Title IX of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1976). The law is entitled Racket-
eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The sections of RICO under which
the defendants were charged are as follows:
[§ 1962.] (c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with
any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the
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district court jury. Anderson and Mooney were convicted on all
twenty-eight counts.
The defendants appealed their convictions to the Eighth Cir-
cuit, jointly asserting six errors on the part of the district court:
(1) permitting the application of RICO; (2) failing to grant sev-
erance of the trial; (3) allowing the Government to introduce tes-
timony regarding Anderson's previous felony conviction;
(4) forcing the defense to reveal the names of the prospective de-
fense witnesses during the voir dire; (5) improper rulings regard-
ing the selection of jurors; and (6) not granting a change in
venue.
5
The Eighth Circuit reversed only the convictions under Counts 16
and III, under which the defendants had been charged with viola-
tions of the federal racketeering statute known as the Racketeer In-
fluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).8 United States v.
Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1980).
The court addressed "only the issue of statutory interpretation
of the term 'enterprise' as used in RICO."9 Courts dealing with the
conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity or collection of unlawful debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the
provisions [of section 1962.]
5. United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1361 (8th Cir. 1980).
6. Count I of the indictment charged violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (c), alleging that
LESLIE ANDERSON and LEONARD MOONEY were persons associated with
an enterprise engaged in, and the activities of which affected, interstate commerce,
namely each of the said defendants and Paul A. Baldwin were associated in fact to
defraud, and to obtain money by means of false and fraudulent pretenses, repre-
sentations and promises from Sharp and Fulton Counties, Arkansas, and the peo-
ple of said counties, and the said defendants, LESLIE ANDERSON and
LEONARD MOONEY, did knowingly and willfully conduct and participate di-
rectly and indirectly in the conducting of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern
of racketeering activity as defined in Title 18, United States Code, Section 1961
United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1362 (8th Cir. 1980).
7. Count II of the indictment charged violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and (d), alleging
that
LESLIE ANDERSON and LEONARD MOONEY, defendants herein, being as-
sociated with an enterprise engaged in and whose activities affect interstate com-
merce, as defined in Section 1961 of Title 18, United States Code, that is the
association in fact with Paul A. Baldwin, d/b/a the "Lisco" Company, did know-
ingly and willfully conspire, confederate and agree together and with each other, to
conduct and participate in, directly and indirectly, conduct of subject enterprise's
affairs, through a pattern of racketeering activity * * *
Id.
8. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Title IX, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1976).
9. United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1362 (8th Cir. 1980). "'[E]nterprise' in-
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problem of construing a statute have customarily turned to the legis-
lative history for help.
Material concerning RICO contained in the Congressio,7a/ Rec-
ord revealed that the Act is the product of two bills introduced in
the Senate in 1969.10 Both bills demonstrated congressional concern
over the inability of law enforcement officers to combat the growth
of organized crime and its contamination of legitimate businesses.
The legislative debates that accompanied RICO's passage reflect
that concern. Senator John L. McClellan, one of the bill's sponsors
and floor leader at that time, warned the Senate: "With its extensive
infiltration of legitimate business, organized crime thus poses a new
threat to the American economic system.""I The purpose of the pro-
posed legislation was repeated throughout the debates: "to curb
organized crime by strengthening the Federal criminal justice sys-
tem." 12
On October 15, 1970, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organization Act became a federal law "expressly aimed at remov-
ing the baneful influence of organized crime from our legitimate
commercial endeavors. . . .", The congressional statement of pur-
pose set a high goal: to eradicate organized crime by strengthening
legal tools in the evidence-gathering process. 4 Congress evidently
sought to accomplish this goal by creating a new federal "racketeer-
ing" offense in RICO.' 5 This offense is committed when there is a
cludes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any
union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity." 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(4) (1976).
10. The two bills were S. 30, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 Cong. Rec. 769, 827-32 (1969),
introduced on January 15, 1969 by Senator McClellan, and S. 1623, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115
Cong. Rec. 6925 (1969), known as the Criminal Activities Profiles Act, introduced by Sena-
tor Hruska on March 20, 1969. Less than one month later Senators McClellan and Hruska
jointly introduced the Corrupt Organizations Act of 1969, S. 1861, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 115
Cong. Rec. 9512, 9566-71 (1969), and Congressman Poff introduced a companion bill in the
House, H.R. 10312, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 115 Cong. Rec. 9753 (1969). These bills merged to
form Title IX, RICO, which is discussed in 116 Cong. Rec. 602 (1970).
11. 115 Cong. Rec. 5874 (1969).
12. 116 Cong. Rec. 35196 (1970). Early in 1970 a synopsis of the proposed racketeering
statute was presented as follows:
Title IX-Corrupt Organizations
Prohibits infiltration of legitimate organizations by racketeers or proceeds of
racketeering activities where interstate commerce is affected. ...
116 Cong. Rec. 585 (1970) (emphasis added).
13. 116 Cong. Rec. 8670 (1970).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1976).
15. (1) "racketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat involving murder, kid-
napping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic or
1981]
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pattern of underlying criminal acts which occur within a ten-year
period and are connected with the same enterprise. 16 The predicate
offenses themselves are already defined and prohibited by other fed-
eral and state laws. 17 It is the added "enterprise"1 8 element that
completes the definition of a RICO offense. In other words, the
predicate acts alone cannot form a violation of the statute. It is the
connection of those criminal acts with an enterprise that causes de-
fendant's conduct to violate the federal Act. Without this added
"enterprise" element, conduct prohibited by the federal statute
would be so similar to that prohibited by the laws defining the pred-
icate offenses, a defendant could be tried and convicted twice for the
same conduct. 9
Although the legislative history of RICO is extensive, the his-
tory does not elaborate on the statutory definition of "enterprise."
The language of the Act itself has led to varied judicial interpreta-
tions of the term. The Second Circuit was first faced with determin-
ing the scope of "enterprise" in United States v. Parness2 ° in 1974.
Parness held that "enterprise" does include foreign as well as do-
mestic corporations.21 Later that same year the Seventh Circuit de-
termined that "enterprise" is meant to include illegitimate as well as
other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by im-
prisonment for more than one year ....
18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1976) (emphasis added).
16. (5) "pattern of racketeering activity" requires at least two acts of racketeering
activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of
which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the
commission of a prior act of racketeering activity ...
18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1976) (emphasis added).
With a literal reading of this definition, RICO allows convictions in situations where
the predicate offenses would be time-barred from prosecution if brought under the applica-
ble state or federal statutes violated. Courts have consistently upheld this interpretation.
See, e.g., United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127, (3rd Cir. 1977); United States v. Brown,
555 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978); United States v. Revel, 493
F.2d 1, 3 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 909 (1975); United States v. Fineman, 434 F.
Supp. 189, 194 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aft'd, 571 F.2d 572 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 945
(1978). But for a strong opposing argument see United States v. Davis, 576 F.2d 1065, 1068
(3rd Cir.) (Aldisert, J., concurring), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 836 (1978).
17. See definition of "racketeering activity" in note 15 supra and of "pattern of racke-
teering activity" in note 16 supra.
18. See definition of "enterprise" in note 9 supra.
19. In other words, a defendant could be charged and convicted in a state court for two
separate burglaries, and later that same individual could be indicted and convicted for the
same burglaries under RICO simply because the crimes occurred within ten years of each
other and one occurred after RICO's passage.
20. 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975).
21. Id. at 439.
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legitimate businesses. 2
In the instant case the court agreed with Anderson and Mooney
that the district court had erred in permitting RICO to be applied to
them. The Eighth Circuit held that RICO could reach only those
involved in racketeering activity through a business or other "associ-
ation having an ascertainable structure . . . that has an existence
that can be defined apart from the commission of the predicate
acts, "23 ie., the underlying offenses prohibited by other state and
federal laws. The circuit court did not agree with the district court
that the conspiracy itself fulfilled the "enterprise" element 24 neces-
sary to trigger the application of RICO to continuing criminal activ-
ity.
The court held that the "term 'enterprise' must signify an asso-
ciation that is substantially different from the acts which form the
'pattern of racketeering activity.' A contrary interpretation would
alter the essential elements of the offense as determined by Con-
gress."2z5 The court would not find an association of three men con-
spiring to execute bribery schemes to be a RICO "enterprise." The
charges named no association which would have existed independ-
ent of the predicate crimes.26
To reach its holding the Eighth Circuit first looked to the lan-
guage of the Act. The court viewed RICO as a complex but care-
fully drafted piece of legislation.27 The court followed a universal
22. United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1358 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
925 (1974). See, e.g., United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 303 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. de-
nied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980) (series of house burglaries in two states); United States v. Rone,
598 F.2d 564, 568 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980) (association for bookmak-
ing, mail fraud, extortion, and murder); United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 897 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978) (amoeba-like infra-structure that controls a secret criminal
network); United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 106 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1039 (1977) (illegal gambling business); United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472, 479 (5th Cir.
1976) (association to participate in illegal gambling); United States v. Morris, 532 F.2d 436,
442 (5th Cir. 1976) (association to defraud through illegal card games).
23. United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1372 (8th Cir. 1980).
24. See the definition of "enterprise" in note 9 supra.
25. United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1365 (8th Cir. 1980).
26. The Anderson court suggests that both Anderson and Mooney might have been
brought under RICO if the defendants had been charged by the prosecution with conducting
the affairs of their county governments through a pattern of racketeering activity. The court
asserted that such a formulation of the charge would have avoided the particular issue on
appeal in that the county governments necessarily constitute "enterprises" separate and dis-
tinct from the pattern of racketeering activity. However, the court went on to suggest that it
probably still would have been confronted with the issue of defining the scope of the term
"enterprise" because the argument that the term does not encompass government agencies
or offices was not settled. 626 F.2d at 1365, n.10.
27. Id. at 1365. See Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 789 (1975).
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rule of construction by giving effect to each word of the statute in
order to discover the true intention of the legislature.28 It stressed
that an overly broad interpretation of "enterprise" would effectively
make that term interchangeable with the "pattern of racketeering
activity" involved. The court demonstrated the flaw in expansive
construction by noting that, if "enterprise" could include associa-
tions formed solely for illicit purposes with no legitimate business
structure or connection, then proof of an "enterprise" could be
demonstrated simply by showing collaboration to commit the pat-
tern of racketeering activity.29
The court agreed with the Second and Fifth Circuits that the
"enterprise" element stands as the focal point of the offense. The
court determined that the "enterprise" element provides the rela-
tionship between the predicate offenses, thus preventing the prohibi-
tions of RICO from covering purely sporadic criminal activity.
The court also noted that only by requiring proof of an "enter-
prise" that engages in or has activities affecting interstate or foreign
commerce does section 1962(c) of RICO require proof of a fact
other than those required to prove the predicate crimes.3° Because a
defendant may be separately prosecuted for the two predicate of-
fenses, RICO, without the enterprise element, would provide the
means to prosecute a defendant again for the predicate crimes. This
would be a clear violation of the fifth amendment's guarantee
against double jeopardy.3'
The court stood firmly behind the premise that due process re-
quires that criminal laws be written to give fair notice of the conduct
they prohibit.32 It stated that due process requires strict construction
of the RICO provisions in spite of Congress's statement in section
904 of Pub. L. 91-452, 84 Stat. 947 (1970), that RICO "shall be liber-
ally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes. ' 33 The court dis-
agreed with other circuits which have placed reliance on that
28. See, e.g., United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955).
29. But see United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 303 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 946 (1980), which allowed this broad construction and found that three home burgla-
ries could provide a basis for a RICO violation.
30. United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1367; see United States v. Solano, 605
F.2d 1141, 1143-45 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1020 (1980). But see United States
v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 571 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980).
31. United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1367.
32. Id. at 1369. See also United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 374 (1978).
33. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1976).
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statement as support for an expansive definition of "enterprise. 34
The court also looked to the "rule of lenity," which requires
resolution of ambiguities in penal statutes in favor of lenity, as sup-
port for its determination that a broad definition of "enterprise" is
erroneous. 35 Another factor on which the court relied to reach its
conclusion was that an expansive definition of "enterprise" would
disrupt the balance between federal and state criminal prosecutions
by bringing into the ambit of the federal statute offenses which Con-
gress did not consider sufficiently threatening to the economy to
warrant federal intervention. With an expansive definition any two
of the wide range of criminal acts that can make up a "pattern of
racketeering activity" 36 plus a simple association would provide the
only elements that would have to be shown in order to permit fed-
eral prosecution in an area formerly reserved for state jurisdiction.
The court stated, "We cannot assume Congress was this careless.
37
The court concluded that without the essential "enterprise" ele-
ment the defendants' conduct could not be prosecuted under RICO.
The Eighth Circuit observed that there was no indication in the leg-
islative history of RICO that "Congress ever intended to grant fed-
eral prosecutors the flexibility to pursue relatively minor offenders,
having no connection with organized crime, who simply associate to
commit two of the predicate crimes."38 Rather, the court deter-
mined that the motivating policy of the Act was to free the nation's
economic system from the tentacles of organized crime.
The court recognized that its decision to narrowly construe
RICO provisions places the Eighth Circuit in opposition to five
other circuits.39 The opinion of one ally has been reversed,40 and
34. See, e.g., United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1039 (1977).
35. United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1370 (1980). E.g., United States v. Em-
mons, 410 U.S. 396, 411 (1973); Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1970).
36. See note 16 supra.
37. United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1370.
38. Id. at 1372.
39. See United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. Rone,
598 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980); United States v. Aleman, 609
F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980); United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d
880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978); United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104 (2d
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977).
40. United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd inpart on rehearing, 642
F.2d 1001 (1980). Although the Sutton court narrowly construed the term "enterprise," that
case really turned on a different issue. The Sixth Circuit defined "enterprise" in RICO as
only applying to legitimate businesses. That court held that the "enterprise" could not be a
wholly illegal operation--such as a prostitution ring--and still come under the scope of the
statute. The court did not address the issue of whether the conspiracy to commit the predi-
19811 NOTE
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there is only one other circuit case which also appears to construe
RICO narrowly.4'
RICO is extraordinary legislation, powerful and complex, cre-
ated to battle a formidable enemy of the American economy: orga-
nized crime. The broad language of the statute lends itself easily to
varying interpretations of the elements of the federal crime. By nar-
rowly defining "enterprise," the Eighth Circuit reached the conclu-
sion that there was no RICO violation in this case. As the court
observed, the legislative history of the Act supports the position that
the defendants' conspiracy with Baldwin to participate in the brib-
ery and kickback schemes was not in itself sufficient to fulfill the
"enterprise" element essential to support a RICO charge. The legis-
lative history demonstrates that RICO was designed to eliminate
organized crime's use of racketeering profits to infiltrate and control
private, legitimate businesses. At present, however, there is great
potential for abuse under the Act. Its sweeping language, coupled
with judicial willingness to construe it broadly, has allowed the fed-
eral government to convict minor offenders whose sporadic criminal
acts have no connection with organized crime or with interstate
commerce.42
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cate offenses can itself fulfill the requirements for RICO's "enterprise" element which is the
issue confronting the Eighth Circuit in the subject case.
41. United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 938
(1981). The district court in Turkette held that RICO cannot reach individuals involved in
wholly criminal "enterprises."
42. United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026 (4th Cir. 1980) (RICO not limited to orga-
nized crime in "classic 'mobster' sense"); United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980) (conviction under RICO for three house burglaries);
United States v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979)
(forfeiture of a family restaurant on the basis of insubstantial contacts with illegal cocaine
traffic).
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